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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper, I compared the approaches to deemed consent in England and
Scotland.1 Moorlock has since responded, suggesting that I am incorrect on the points
made.2 Here, I demonstrate that Moorlock’s take is problematic because it is based on
misinterpretations of my arguments.
II. FAMILY VETO
Moorlock contends that I did not compare like with like when exploring the family’s
role in the new deemed consent systems. No clinical guidance was published in Scot-
land at the time, so I was comparing legislation and guidance in England with just
legislation in Scotland. Moorlock is correct that there are issues in doing so, but such is
the nature of analyzing evolving policies. I did acknowledge this, noting the apparent
difference might disappear if guidance were published in Scotland. Incidentally, such
guidance has since been published, and it does align with the English guidance on the
matter of deeming consent in the absence of consultation with someone in a qualifying
relationship.3 This is not indicative of a flaw in my earlier analysis but, rather, it
having (rather swiftly) become outdated. Incidentally, the Welsh guidance does permit
donation to proceed when the family is uncontactable—albeit with requirements that
make this unlikely.4
1 Jordan A. Parsons, Deemed consent for organ donation: a comparison of the English and Scottish approaches, 8(1)
J. Law Biosci., lsab003 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsab003.
2 Greg Moorlock, Premature presumptions about presumed consent: why Parsons’ comparison is mistaken, J. Law
Biosci., lsab024 (2021).
3 Scottish Government, Guidance on Deceased Organ and Tissue Donation in Scotland: Authorisation Requirements
for Donation and Pre-death Procedures, at para 107.
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Additionally, Moorlock suggests I was wrong to claim the Scottish model (as it
would have been, absent the recent guidance) helps overcome the family veto by
permitting donation to proceed where the family is uncontactable. However, Moorlock
appears to be commenting on a claim I did not make. Discussing how the Scottish
model could be considered a slightly harder opt out, I specifically used the language
of the role of the family. I do not refer to the English guidance that donation should
not proceed where the family is uncontactable as a family veto. Indeed, I comment
on how ‘[o]ne might conceive of a person in a qualifying relationship as having more
power in their absence than in their presence’5 because the veto—meaning an active
objection when contactable—requires them to evidence their claim that the deceased
would object. The same comment on the role of the family is now applicable to the
Scottish system.
III. DUTY ON MINISTERS
Second, Moorlock takes issue with my argument that a lack of a duty on ministers to
ensure awareness of the new system in England is less desirable than the presence of
such a duty in Scotland (and Wales). He appears to have read my argument as far more
empirical than it is. I have not claimed that Scotland’s duty on ministers will result in
greater public awareness. Rather, I suggested that the Scottish approach is preferable in
terms of its principled recognition of autonomy.
Moorlock is correct that there is a focus on public awareness in England, but my
contention is that the decision not to introduce a legal duty on ministers suggests a
lesser focus than elsewhere in Great Britain. It cannot be claimed that it was simply not
thought of as a possible feature of the legislation because Wales had, years previously,
included such a duty. In England, then, there was an active decision to depart from the
Welsh example.
Moorlock is certainly right that ‘formality’ is open to interpretation, and some may
think that my phrasing was too strong. Nonetheless, it remains that the choice not to
include a duty on ministers after Wales had previously done so represents a less formal
recognition. Where something as significant as an alteration to the nature of consent is
introduced, I consider it important that there be as formal as possible a recognition of
the importance of public awareness—in this case, a duty on ministers.
IV. COVID-19 RESPONSE
Finally, Moorlock argues that, contrary to my position, England did respond to the
challenge of COVID-19. He cites NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) meeting
minutes in which the challenges are acknowledged such that the Department of Health
and Social Care considers it ‘unlikely that transplants will proceed under deemed
consent’.6 However, Moorlock places significant weight on this informal statement of
what the Department anticipates—that it is ‘unlikely’ to happen, not that it will not be
permitted to happen. It remains that there has been no pandemic-related legal obstacle
5 Parsons, supra note 1, at 8.
6 NHS Blood and Transplant, NHSBT Board Meeting May 2020, https://nhsbtdbe.blob.core.windows.net/
umbraco-assets-corp/18858/11-organ-donation-consent-legislation-and-public-awareness-campaign-upda
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to the operation of deemed consent in England since its implementation. If genuinely
concerned about its timing, England would have delayed the change like Scotland. As
such, based on the meeting minutes, it is inaccurate to say that England changed its
approach to implementation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Further, concern with the system being introduced during the pandemic is not only
about how it plays out in clinical practice but also public perception.7 The NHSBT
minutes acknowledge a worry that it ‘might attract negative media attention that may
cause long-term reputational damage’.8 Given the recognition of this risk and the
expectation that deemed consent would not operate during the pandemic, it is puzzling
why implementation would not be delayed. Moorlock has not clearly demonstrated
that England changed course in any significant way in response to the pandemic context.
V. CONCLUSION
Moorlock appears to have misinterpreted several of my earlier points. I previously
acknowledged that Scotland would likely produce clinical guidance, I did not frame
the role of the family as a veto, and I did not claim that public awareness could not be
achieved without a legal duty on ministers. Further, I do not consider it a response to
the pandemic that the Department of Health and Social Care merely acknowledged
issues with the timing of deemed consent’s implementation. Moorlock might consider
my analysis to have been premature, but, given the tentative phrasing of much of my
discussion, I think it entirely appropriate.
7 Jordan A. Parsons and Greg Moorlock, A global pandemic is not a good time to introduce ‘opt-out’ for organ
donation, 20 Med. Law Int. 155 (2020).
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